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Wilson: Wilson: Arbitration Awards in Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance Provisions:

ARBITRATION AWARDS IN UNINSURED
AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST
INSURANCE PROVISIONS: WHICH
PUBLIC POLICY TO APPLY?
Mendes v. Automobile Insurance Co. of Hartford1

I. INTRODUCTION
Automobile insurance is considered by many to be a necessary evil. Most
of us purchase such insurance with two thoughts in mind: How much coverage
do I get and what will it cost me? Normally, we get a copy of the policy weeks
after signing the agreement. Seldom do we bother to read the lengthy, complicated contract. Many policies contain provisions that give the insurer and/or the
insured the right to have certain disputes settled by arbitration instead of litigation.
Over the years, as court dockets have become more and more crowded,
arbitration has grown to be highly favored as a means of settling disputes.
Consequently, courts give great deference to arbitration awards and reverse them
only for specific reasons.
This Note examines how the Connecticut Supreme Court handled a case
involving an automobile insurance policy that called for arbitration of disputes
concerning uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, but allowed either party
to demand a trial de novo if unsatisfied With the arbitration award.
II. THE CASE
On July 24, 1986, Manuel Mendes acquired automobile insurance coverage
from Automobile Insurance Company of Hartford.2 On November 17, 1986, Luis
Mendes, the plaintiff and an insured under the policy, was injured when struck by
an automobile driven by Margaret Monterosso.3 Monterosso's insurance provided
her with $20,000 in bodily injury liability coverage, which plaintiff collected from
Monterosso's carrier.4
5
Subsequently, plaintiff sought recovery under the Mendes insurance policy
for his incurred expenses which exceeded the amount recovered from Monteros-

1. 212 Conn. 652, 563 A.2d 695 (1989).
2. Id. at 653, 563 A.2d at 695.
3. Id. at 654, 563 A.2d at 696.

4. id
5. Manuel Mendes purchased the insurance at issue on his automobiles. Luis Mendes, an insured
under the policy, was a pedestrian when struck by Monterosso. Luis was the plaintiff. References to
the "Mendes insurance policy" refer to the policy purchased by Manuel that covered Luis.
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so's insurance carrier.6 The Mendes insurance policy with the defendant
insurance company provided that certain disputes over uninsured and underinsured
motorist claims were to be settled by binding arbitration.7 The policy had an
escape clause which provided:
However, either party may make a written demand for a trial if the
amount of damages awarded is greater than the minimum limit for
bodily injury liability specified by the financial responsibility law of the
state in which your covered auto is principally garaged. If this demand
is .not made within 60 days of the decision of the arbitrator(s), the
amount of damages awarded by the arbitrator(s) will be binding.
(escape clause)'
Connecticut's minimum coverage limit for bodily injury liability was $20,000."
Pursuant to the arbitration provision contained in the Mendes insurance
policy, 'plaintiff requested arbitration with the defendant.1 ° A three person
arbitration panel heard the claim." On September 21, 1988, the panel awarded
the plaintiff $50,000 in underinsured motorist benefits. 2
However, the defendant did not want to be bound by the arbitrators' decision
and demanded a trial de novo, as was provided in the escape clause.' 3 On
October 21, 1988, the defendant filed an application with the Superior Court to
vacate the arbitration award. 4 Defendant argued that it was entitled to a trial de
novo pursuant to the express language in the policy's escape clause since the
arbitration awarded exceeded $20,000.' On October 26, 1988, plaintiff filed an
application with the Superior Court seeking to confirm the arbitration award and
requesting that an order be issued directing the defendant to pay the full amount
of the award, plus interest from the date of the award.16 The trial court granted
the plaintiff's request to confirm the arbitrators' award and accordingly denied the

6. Mendes, 212 Conn. at 654, 563 A.2d at 696. The defendant's insurance policy provided
underinsured motorist coverage in the amount of $100,000. Id. at n.2.
7. Id. at 653, 563 A.2d at 695-96.
8. Id.
9. Id.; see CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 38-175c, 14-112 (1987).
10. Mendes, 212 Conn. at 654, 563 A.2d 696.
11. Id. The policy provided that when the amount demanded exceeded $40,000 the dispute was
to be heard by a panel of three arbitrators. Il at 653, 563 A.2d at 695.
12. Id. at 654, 563 A.2d at 696.
13. Id.
14. Id. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52-418(aX4) permitted defendant to apply for an order vacating an
arbitration award if the arbitrators "exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made." Mendes, 212 Conn.
at 654 n.3, 563 A.2d at 696 n.3.
15. Id. at 654-55, 563 A.2d at 696.
16. Id. at 655, 563 A.2d at 696. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52-417 permitted the plaintiff to apply for
an order confirming the arbitration award. Mendes, 212 Conn. at 655 n.4, 563 A.2d at 696 n.4.
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defendant's request to vacate the arbitration award. 7 The trial court relied on
Connecticut General Statute Section 38-175c, which it felt manifests a strong
public policy in favor of final arbitral resolution of disputes concerning the amount
of uninsured motorist benefits.1 8 The trial court determined that the escape
clause permitted the defendant to set aside arbitral awards in excess of $20,000
whenever it chose and as such, violated public policy.' 9 The trial court also
relied heavily on three out-of-state cases that held similar escape clauses to be
void as contrary to public policy. 20
The Supreme Court of Connecticut accepted the trial court's analysis and
affirmed the granting of plaintiff's request to confirm the arbitration award and to
deny the defendant's application to vacate the award.21 In affirming, the
Supreme Court held that a provision of an automobile insurance policy that
provides for binding arbitration whenever disputes arise as to the amount of
coverage in uninsured or underinsured claims, yet permits either the insured or the
insurer to demand a trial de novo whenever the arbitration award exceeds the
statutorily required minimum coverage limit for bodily injury liability, is
unenforceable as against public policy. 22

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Brief Background of Arbitration
Arbitration has been defined as "[a]n arrangement for taking and abiding by
the judgment of selected persons in some disputed matter, instead of carrying it
to established tribunals of justice, and is intended to avoid the formalities, the
delay, the expense and vexation of ordinary litigation." 23 Historically, though,
24
the common law has disfavored arbitration as a means of settling disputes.
Courts were reluctant to force parties to settle rights without the protection of a

17. Id. at 655, 563 A.2d at 696.
18. Id. at 655-56, 563 A.2d at 696-97.
19. Id. at 656, 563 A.2d at 697. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38-175c "requires every uninsured motorist
insurance policy that contains 'a provision for binding arbitration to include a provision for final
determination of insurance coverage in such arbitration proceeding.'" Mendes, 212 Conn. at 655, 563
A.2d at 696.
20. Mendes, 212 Conn. at 656-57, 563 A.2d at 696-97; see Schmidt v. Midwest Family Mut. Ins.
Co., 413 N.W.2d 178 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), a~fd en banc, 426 N.W.2d 870 (Minn. 1988);
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marsh, 15 Ohio St. 3d 107, 472 N.E.2d 1061 (1984) (Sweeney, J.,
concurring); Pepin v. Am. Universal Ins. Co., 540 A.2d 21 (R.I. 1988).
21. Mendes, 212 Conn. at 661, 563 A.2d at 699. The defendant also argued on appeal that, if the
court held the escape clause to be against public policy, the court should strike the entire arbitration
clause. The court refused to address this contention because the defendant did not raise the issue at
the trial level. Id. at n.6.
22. Id. at 658-61, 563 A.2d at 697-99.
23. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 55 (5th ed. 1979) (abridged copy).
24. 2 A. WIDISS, UNINSURED & UNDERUNSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE § 22.1, at 139 (2d ed.
1987).
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court of law.25 Particularly, courts and legislatures were averse to agreements
to arbitrate disputes that may arise in the future.26 From the early 1800's to the
27
1950's, courts refused to enforce agreements to arbitrate such "future disputes.
However, we have seen an about-face during the twentieth century. This is
evidenced by the fact that every state currently has legislation that modifies the
common law rule at least to some degree.28 In many states, however, these
statutes do not govern arbitration agreements in insurance contracts. 29
One of the building blocks that states have used in developing arbitration
statutes has been the Uniform Arbitration Act. 30 Arbitration statutes in most
states model or copy the Uniform Arbitration Act. 3' The first Uniform Arbitration Act covered arbitration of existing disputes, but it was not until the 1950's
that the revised Act provided for the arbitration of future disputes. 32 Without
question, the public policy in most states now encourages the use of arbitration by
providing33for the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate both present and future
disputes.
B. Arbitration and ContractPrinciples
As a result of this swing in public policy, we are seeing arbitration provisions
being included in contract transactions in increasing numbers.34 It is through
contractual relationships between parties that arbitration is able to flourish.35
Parties are able to construct an arbitration system specifically tailored to meet their
individual needs.'s This is one reason that arbitration has become such a popular
and successful method of resolving disputes without judicial intervention.37
Since arbitration arrangements are so commonly a part of negotiated
contracts, they should be conferred all the powers and rights associated with the
"freedom of contract" principle.38 Contracts have been a successful element in

25. Id. § 23.1, at 147.
26. Id. at 148.
27. Id.
28. Id. § 22.1, at 139.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 140.
31. States that have adopted statutes modeled after the Uniform Arbitration Act are Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Wyoming, as well as the District of Columbia. See Recent
Developments: The Uniform ArbitrationAct, 1989 J. DisP. REsOL 237, 238 n.3.
32. A. WIDIss, supra note 24, § 22.1, at 140.
33. See id
34. A. WiDiss, supra note 24, § 22.1, at 139.
35. See id.at 142.
36. Id.
37. See id.
38. Id. at 142.
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modern law, in part, because they are a product of parties "who meet each other
on a footing of social and approximate economic equality .. . . 39 Thus, the
successful use of arbitration also depends on a degree of equality in bargaining
power.
The onslaught of large scale business brought about the development and
perfection of standardized contracts.' Standardized contracts, once refined, are
used in every dealing with the same products or services.41 Standardized
contracts are normally used by businesses with strong bargaining power.42 The
weaker party typically is not in a position to bargain, either because the stronger
party has a monopoly or because the competition uses the same clauses. 43 The
weaker party is thus placed in the position that it must accept terms dictated by
the stronger party, the consequences of which are often understood only in a vague5
way, if at all." Standardized contracts thus are often contracts of adhesion.4
Although there is some dispute about what actually is a contract of adhesion, most
courts would classify the arbitration provisions of insurance contracts as adhesion
46
contracts.
Standard forms used by most insurers for uninsured and underinsured
motorist insurance include provisions for arbitration if the insurer and the insured
do not agree whether the insured is covered or as to the amount of damages. 47
However, several states specifically prohibit an insurer's use of arbitration to
foreclose a claimant's right to litigate controversies involving the uninsured
motorist insurance or prohibit insurance policies from depriving the courts of
jurisdiction. 4"
A problem arises in the "freedom of contract" principle since insurance
policies are seldom signed or acknowledged by the insured. 49 Several states have
enacted legislation requiring notice to be placed in the insurance contract in a
manner which alerts the insured that the contract contains a provision calling for
binding arbitration of specific disputes." In addition, "Uj]udicial decisions in
many of the states which have enacted either the Uniform Arbitration Act or

39. Kessler, Contracts Of Adhesion -Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUiM. L
REv. 629, 630 (1943).
40. Id. at 631.
41. Id.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 632.
Id.
Id.
Id.
A. WDiss, supra note 24, § 23.2, at 150-51. See also id. § 23.6, at 160-65.
Id § 22.2, at 142.

48. Id. § 23.4, at 154-55. These states are Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Nevada, Texas, Arkansas,
Georgia, Maryland, Mississippi, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia.
Il at 154-56 nn.16-17.
49. Id. § 22.3, at 144, § 23.3, at 154.
50. Id. § 22.3, at 144 nn. 11-12.
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comparable legislation seem to affirm the precept that the parties' decision to use
arbitration must be the result of a voluntary agreement."51
Thus, the use of arbitration provisions in uninsured or underinsured motorist
clauses found in motor vehicle insurance contracts has raised the concern that the
provisions are not the product of a voluntary agreement of the parties.5 2 One
reason for the concern is that the coverage provision of most motor vehicle
insurance policies is a "take it or leave it" proposition.53 Additionally, the
insured commonly can't even examine the contents of the policy until days or
weeks after the application for insurance is completed.54 Also, most purchasers
of motor vehicle insurance are primarily concerned with the acquisition of liability,
collision and comprehensive coverage.55 The uninsured or underinsured
provisions are generally an insignificant element of the purchaser's motives or
56
concerns.
C. GeneralEnforceability of ArbitrationAwards
Many of the issues raised above involve the establishment of the relationship
between insurer and insured, and focus on an insurer's ability to force an insured
to enter arbitration. However, another important aspect of the law of arbitration
as it applies to insurance contracts concerns the enforceability of arbitration awards
once the parties have proceeded to that point. There is an increasing number
of cases where courts have settled issues involving arbitration provisions and have
either specifically upheld the enforceability of the arbitration provision or
implicitly indicated that the clause is enforceable.5 8 Many states have statutes
that specifically allow for arbitration awards to be confirmed by a court.59
Generally, courts only vacate awards when some sort of arbitrator misconduct is
present, such as fraud or dishonesty.'
Arbitration awards involving uninsured or underinsured motorist claims have
typically received the same deference. However, over the past twenty years courts
have increasingly vacated arbitration awards, primarily as a result of disputes
concerning the uninsured motorist coverage. 6' The disputes most often arbitrated
concern the amount of damages to be awarded or whether coverage exists. 62

51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. § 23.5, at 159.
Id. § 23.6, at 160.
Id.
Id. at 161.

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. § 26, at 275.
58. Id. § 23.10, at 171.
59. See, e.g., Mendes, 212 Conn. at 655 n.4, 563 A.2d at 696 n.4 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. §
52-417).
60. A. WIDISS, supra note 24, § 26.3, at 279-82.
61. Id. § 22.4, at 146. See also id. § 26, for an analysis of the trends involved in these decisions.
62. Id. § 22.2, at 142.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1990/iss2/9

6

Wilson: Wilson: Arbitration Awards in Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance Provisions:

1990]

UNINSURED MOTORISTS
D. Enforceability of Trial De Novo Provisions

One exception to the normal deference given to arbitration awards by the
courts has involved a common provision that grants the insured and insurer the
right to a trial de novo if the arbitration award exceeds a specific amount, typically
the statutory minimum liability insurance.63 The issue in the case at hand,
Mendes, involves the enforceability of such a trial de novo provision. '
Three cases in different states have specifically held that a trial de novo
provision in the arbitration clause of uninsured motorist insurance is against public
policy. 65 The first of these three cases, Schmidt v. Midwest Family Mutual
Insurance Co., held that Minnesota's public policy favors the use of arbitration to
resolve disputes between contracting parties and the trial de novo provision was
therefore unenforceable. 66 The appellate court relied on the view that the trial
de novo provision skewed the remedy in favor of the insurer, since the insurer is
the one who would likely be dissatisfied with an award above $25,000, the
statutory minimum bodily injury requirement.67 The appellate court reasoned that
awards under $25,000 would likely be unacceptable to the insured, but the insured
would have to accept the result since it would not have the right to a trial de
novo.68 The appellate court also held that the insurance contract was a
contractual relationship which involved unequal bargaining power and little chance
for negotiation. 69 The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the lower court's
analysis. 70 The higher court also stated that the trial de novo provision resulted
in "complete frustration of the very essence of the public policy favoring
arbitration" and thus the trial court was warranted in rejecting the provision.71
The second of the these cases, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Marsh,
was actually decided on grounds other than public policy.72 The Ohio Supreme
Court threw out the trial de novo provision at issue because the parties did not
discuss the provision at the time the insured purchased the policy. 73 However,
Justice Sweeney, in a concurring opinion, took the chance to analyze the case on
the public policy basis. 74 He stated that the fact that both the insurer and the
insured could demand a trial de novo only amounted to a "facial equality," not a

63. See infra notes 65-81.
64. Mendes, 212 Conn. at 652-53, 563 A.2d at 695.
65. Schmidt, 413 N.W.2d 178; Nationwide Mut., 15 Ohio St. 3d 107,472 N.E.2d 1061 (Sweeney,
J., concurring); Pepin, 540 A.2d 21.
66. Schmidt, 413 N.W.2d 178.
67. Id.

68. Id.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 181.
Schmidt, 426 N.W.2d 870.
Id. at 874.
Nationwide Mut., 15 Ohio St. 3d 107, 472 N.E.2d i061.
Id. at 109, 472 N.E.2d. at 1061-62.
Id. at 110, 472 N.E.2d at 1063.
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true equality. 75 The trial de novo provision provided the insurer with a method
to avoid what it would consider bad results of an arbitration, but the insured did
not realistically have the same opportunity. 76 The provision would permit either
party to avoid a high award that'it found unfavorable, but the Justice reasoned that
it would be very unlikely that an insured would be dissatisfied with a high
award.77
The third of the three cases, Pepin v. American UniversalInsuranceCo., was
decided in Rhode Island. 78 The Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that the
trial de novo provision was against public policy because it circumvented the
whole purpose of arbitration, namely, providing a relatively quick, inexpensive
means for resolving disputes. 79 The court held that a state statute conferred a
right to binding arbitration' "and that the trial de novo provision attempted to
circumvent that right. 8
However, two other state courts have addressed this issue of whether trial de
novo provisions in uninsured motorist insurance violate public policy and ruled
that such escape clauses did not violate public policy.8 2 The first of these two
cases, Roe v. Amica Mutual Insurance Co., resulted in the Florida Supreme
Court's ruling that the escape clause in question did not violate public policy.83
The court's reasoning centered on the language of the Florida Arbitration Statute
which permitted parties to agree to not be bound by the Florida Arbitration
Code." Thus, the court was not convinced that public policy would be offended
by an escape clause allowing a trial de novo.85
In addition, the court was not persuaded by the argument that the escape
clause gives the insurer a means to avoid an arbitration award when the insured
does not practically have the same option available.' It reasoned that the insured
could request a trial de novo had the arbitration award been only slightly over
Florida's statutory minimum of $10,000.87

75. Id. at 100-11, 472 N.E.2d at 1063-64.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Pepin, 540 A.2d 21.
79. Id. at 22.
80. Id. R.I. GEN. LAws § 10-3-2 (1956, 1985 Reenactment) states, "said arbitration procedure
may be enforced at the option of the insured, and in the event the insured exercises said option to
arbitrate, then the provisions of this chapter shall apply and be the exclusive remedy available to the
insured."
81. Pepin, 540 A.2d at 22; R.I. GEN. LAws 10-3-2 (1985 Reenactment).
82. Roe v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 533 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 1988); Cohen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 231 N.J.
Super. 97, 555 A.2d 21 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
83. Roe, 533 So. 2d at 281.
84. Id. FLA. STAT. § 6782.02 (1987) provides that an agreement to arbitrate is enforceable
provided that the act will not apply "to any such agreement or provision to arbitrate in which it is
stipulated that this law shall not apply or to any arbitration or award thereunder.'
85. Roe, 533 So. 2d at 281.
86. Id.
87. Id. In Roe, the arbitrators awarded the insured $225,735 for personal injuries.
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In the second case, Cohen v. Allstate Insurance,the New Jersey court stated
that the applicable New Jersey statute delineated the situations where arbitration
awards could be vacated." The New Jersey legislature mandated binding
arbitration of PIP claims at the option of the insured89 and required non-binding
arbitration of certain automobile tort claims. 90 Thus, the court felt it significant
that the legislature had not required arbitration of uninsured motorist claims at
all. 9'
The court also stated that enforcement of the escape clause did not involve
judicial vacation of the award; rather, it fulfilled the presumed intent of the parties
that the award was to have limited effect. 92 Since the arbitration provision was
a product of the agreement between the insurer and the insured, the court was not
allowed to rewrite the contract in order to expand the scope of the arbitration or
in any other way make it more effective. 93
The insured in Cohen also asserted that the escape clause was unconscionable
because it afforded the insurer the opportunity to reject high awards where the
insured would generally be pleased with such awards. 4 However, the court was
unpersuaded since it could hypothesize situations where the insured could actually
benefit from the escape clause, citing Roe v. Anica Mutual Insurance Co. 95
The above discussion outlines the state of the law as it exists across the
country. In addition, it is important to be familiar with the specific law in
Connecticut, the situs of the case at hand. To begin with, established case law
upholds the enforceability of arbitration awards, even regarding uninsured motorist
claims. 96 For example, in Oliva v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,9 7 the
Connecticut Supreme Court commented that the intent of General Statute Section
38-175c was "to remove from the court and to transfer to the arbitration panel the
function of determining ... all issues as to coverage under automobile liability
insurance policies containing uninsured motorist clauses providing for arbitra-

tion.''98
Also, the case law in Connecticut mirrors the above discussion regarding the
requirement that agreements to arbitrate disputes must be entered into voluntari-

88. Cohen, 231 N.J. Super. at 98, 555 A.2d at 22-23.
89. N.J. REV. STAT. ANN § 39:6A-5c (1990).
90. Id. § 39:6A-31.
91. Cohen, 231 N.J. Super at 98, 555 A.2d at 23.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at _ , 555 A.2d at 24.
96. Mocarski v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n., 3 Conn. App. 250, 487 A.2d 206 (1985); Oliva v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 181 Conn. 37, 434 A.2d 304 (1980); Sowell v. Travelers Indem. Ins. Co.,
31 Conn. Supp. 413, 332 A.2d 792 (1974). Cf Long v. Gen. Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp.,
Ltd., 29 Conn. Supp. 322, 285 A.2d 789 (1971).
97. 181 Conn. 37, 434 A.2d 304 (1980).
98. Id at 42, 434 A.2d at 306.
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ly. 99 This voluntary requirement specifically involved an uninsured motorist
°
claim in HartfordAccident & Indemnity Co. v. Travelers Insurance Co.'0 In
Hartford, the insured attempted to arbitrate whether the other motorist involved
in an accident was uninsured. x1 However, the insurance contract only provided
for arbitration of disputes over whether the insured was entitled to recover, and
°
disputes over the amount the insurer was obligated to pay." The court refused
to force the insurer to arbitrate an issue that it had not voluntarily agreed to submit
to the arbitration process."0 3 It is within the above framework that the Connecticut Supreme Court entered the Mendes case.
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
As stated above, the Connecticut Supreme Court relied on three rationales in
4
declaring the "escape clause" in issue to be contrary to public policy.'
However, it is important to note that the court characterized insureds as laymen
who might not be represented by counsel.' 5 It was from this perspective that
In discussing the escape clause, the court
the court approached the case."
decided that it was "wishful thinking" on the part of the defendant to believe that
10 7
a layman was adequately put on notice by the language in the escape clause.
The court portrayed the plaintiff as an "unwary claimant" who was "lured" into an
arbitration process favored by the courts, just to discover that an award above
$20,000 was nonbinding and that the defendant could demand a trial.10
In reaching its decision, the Connecticut Supreme Court accepted the analysis
of the trial court, which included two rationales for its decision.' °9 The court
then offered a third rationale of its own.110
First, the court accepted the trial court's reliance on General Statute Section
38-175c which requires uninsured motorist coverage in all motor vehicle liability
insurance policies and requires that where arbitration is provided for, it shall be
binding."' Even though Section 38-175c actually addresses the arbitrability of
the question of whether the claimant is covered, the trial court determined that the

99. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 25 Conn. Supp. 414, 206 A.2d 847
(1964); Gores v. Rosenthal, 150 Conn. 554, 192 A.2d 210 (1963).
100. 25 Conn. Supp. 414, 206 A.2d 847 (1964).
101. Id at 415, 206 A.2d at 848.
102. Id
103. Id at 416, 206 A.2d at 849.
104. Mendes, 212 Conn. at 658-61, 563 A.2d.at 697-99.
105. Id. at 659, 563 A.2d at 698.
106. Id
107. Id.
108. Id. at 659-60, 563 A.2d at 698.
109. Id. at 655-58, 563 A.2d at 696-98.
110. Id. at 660, 563 A.2d at 698-99.
111. Id. at 655-56, 563 A.2d at 696-97.
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statute manifests a strong public policy favoring final arbitration of uninsured
motorist insurance policies. 2
Second, the court agreed with the trial court's reliance on three out-of-state
cases." 3 All three cases are significantly similar to the case at hand in that the
facts in each case are very similar and that each case involves an escape clause
virtually identical to the one in question here." 4 The court cited Schmidt v.
Midwest Family Mutual Insurance Co., which held that the escape clause
"skew[ed] the trial de novo remedy in favor of the insurer," which is more likely
to be dissatisfied with an award above the statutory minimum liability coverage. '
The Schmidt court characterized the situation as "one of unequal
bargaining power and little opportunity for negotiation.",1 6 The Schmidt court
also held that the escape clause "contravenes public policies favoring arbitration
and judicial economy.017
The court also accepted the trial court's reliance on the concurring opinion
in NationwideMutual InsuranceCo. v. Marsh. That concurrence states that even
though both the insured and the insurer could demand a trial de novo if unsatisfied
with the arbitration award "[t]his 'facial equality' is not a true equality, however,
because both parties are bound only by low awards, which are likely to be in
Nationwide's favor.""'
The court further cites the Nationwide concurring
opinion, which notes that "the escape clause contravened Ohio's strong public
policy in favor of final and binding arbitration."" 9
The court also relied on Pepin v. American UniversalInsuranceCo., which
emphasizes that the escape clause evaded "[t]he whole purpose of arbitration,
namely, providing an expedient and inexpensive mechanism for finally resolving
disputes .... ,120
The Connecticut Supreme Court found a third rationale for its holding.'
It reasoned that an insurance company could use this type of escape clause to
apply pressure on a claimant who received a large arbitration award to accept a
settlement or compromise by threatening to demand a trial de novo. 22 The

112. Id.
113. Id. at 656-58, 563 A.2d at 696-97; Schmid4 413 N.W.2d 178; Nationwide Mut., 15 Ohio St.
3d 107, 472 N.E.2d 1061; Pepin, 540 A.2d 21.
114. Schmidt, 413 N.W.2d at 179; Nationwide, 15 Ohio St. 3d at ___, 472 N.E.2d at 1061-62 n.2;
Pepin, 540 A.2d at 22.
115. Mendes, 212 Conn. at 656, 563 A.2d at 697 (quoting Schmidt, 413 N.W.2d at 180).
116. Id, at 656-57, 563 A.2d at 697 (quoting Schmidt, 413 N.W.2d at 181).
117. Id. at 657, 563 A.2d at 697 (quoting Schmidt, 413 N.W.2d at 181).
118. Id. at 657, 563 A.2d at 697 (quoting Nationwide Mut., 15 Ohio St. 3d at _,
472 N.E.2d
at 1063).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 657, 563 A.2d at 697 (quoting Pepin, 540 A.2d at 22).
121. Id. at 660, 563 A.2d at 698-99.
122. Id.
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of "a strong public
court offered General Statute Section 38-61(6)(k) as evidence
23
policy against such unfair claim settlement practices."'
Thus, in affirming the trial court, the court held that the provision of the
automobile insurance policy that provided for binding arbitration whenever
disputes arose as to the amount of coverage in uninsured or underinsured claims,
award
yet permitted the insurer to demand a trial de novo whenever the arbitration
124
exceeded $20,000, was unenforceable as against public policy.
V. COMMENT
As stated above, the Connecticut Supreme Court relied on three rationales 1in
declaring the "escape clause" in issue to be contrary to public policy. 2
However, it is important to note that the court characterized the insured as a
layman who might not be represented by counsel.126 It was from this perspective that the court approached the case. 127 In discussing the escape clause, the
court decided that it was "wishful thinking" on the part of the defendant to believe
that a layman was adequately put on notice by the language in the escape
clause."
The court portrayed the plaintiff as an "unwary claimant" that was
"lured" into an arbitration process favored by the courts, just to discover that an
award above $20,000 was nonbinding and that the defendant could demand a
trial.1 29
A. The Court Ignores Two Cases That
Go in the Opposite Direction
In arriving at its decision that the escape clause in defendant's policy violated
public policy, the court accepted the trial court's reliance on three out-of-state
cases, Schmidt, Nationwide and Pepin. However, the court either failed to, or
chose not to, discuss two other cases that held that similar escape clauses did not
violate public policy: Roe v. Amica Mutual Insurance Co. and Cohen v. Allstate
Insurance Co. 30 Would a consideration of these two other cases made a
difference? It seems not. The language in this court's opinion clearly indicates
that it was sympathetic with the insured.

123. Id. (§ 38-61(6)(k) provides that it is an unfair claim settlement practice to have a business
practice that makes it known to insureds or claimants that the insurance company has "a policy of
appealing from arbitration awards in favor of insureds or claimants for the purpose of compelling them
to accept settlements or compromises less than the amount awarded in arbitration.").
124. Mendes, 212 Conn. at 661, 563 A.2d at 699.
125. Id. at 658-61, 563 A.2d at 697-99.
126. Id. at 659, 563 A.2d at 698.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 659-60, 563 A.2d at 698.
130. Roe was decided in October, 1988, and Cohen was decided in February, 1989. Both cases
were available to the defendant and the court as Mendes was argued in June, 1989.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1990/iss2/9

12

Wilson: Wilson: Arbitration Awards in Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance Provisions:
UNINSURED MOTORISTS
1990]
The Mendes court could have easily distinguished the case before it from
Roe. The Roe court rejected arguments that the escape clause, which was identical
to the one in our case, violated Florida public policy. The Roe court relied on
Florida Statute Section 682.02, which calls for the enforceability of arbitration
agreements. 13' However, the cited statute permits parties to agree to not be
bound by the statute.1' The Connecticut statute has no such provision. In fact,
the statute requires that uninsured motorist insurance include "a provision for final
determination of insurance coverage in such arbitration proceeding." 133 The
court used this language to find that the statute indicated a strong public policy in
13
favor of binding arbitration in uninsured motorist insurance.'
The Cohen case would not have been so easily distinguished from the case
at bar. First, Cohen, the insured, argued that the court had no basis to vacate the
award, since the New Jersey statute specified the situations where a court could
vacate an arbitration award, and none of those situations applied. 35 The New
Jersey court easily quashed this argument by stating that it was not vacating the
award, but merely enforcing
the agreement that the parties had made as to the use
36
of a trial de novo.1
The Cohen court, as did the Roe court, also relied on statutory authority to
decide that the escape clause did not violate public policy. 37 The Cohen court
decided that since the New Jersey statutes did not actually require binding
arbitration of uninsured motorist claims, the public policy was "to encourage resort
to arbitration while preserving full flexibility to the parties to elect or reject, and
to structure and limit, that process as they choose." 38 The Cohen court also
rejected the plaintiff's argument that the escape clause permitted the insurer to get
out of high awards, while the insured was bound by low awards. 39 The court
argued that it could hypothesize situations where the insured would welcome the
chance to demand a trial de novo.' 4°

131. Roe, 533 So. 2d at 281 (§ 682.02 states that an agreement to arbitrate "shall be valid,
enforceable, and irrevocable without regard to the justiciable character of the controversy; provided that
this act shall not apply to any such agreement or provision to arbitrate in which it is stipulated that this
law shall not apply or to any arbitration or award thereunder.").
132. Roe, 533 So. 2d at 281.
133. Mendes, 212 Conn. at 655, 563 A.2d at 696.
134. 1l at 656-57, 563 A.2d at 696-97.
135. Cohen, 231 NJ. Super. at __, 555 A.2d at 22-23.

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at _., 555 A.2d at 23.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at ., 555 A.2d at 24.
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B. Why Courts Have Gone Opposite Directions on
Nearly Identical Escape Clauses and
Public Policies FavoringArbitrations
So, the scene is set. Which view of the enforceability of the escape clause
found in uninsured or underinsured motorist insurance provisions is the best? All
of the courts in the above cases emphasize the strong public policy in favor of
enforcing arbitration. Yet, on virtually identical factual situations and escape
clauses, the courts have gone in completely opposite directions. What makes the
difference?
It seems to this author that the conflict boils down to where a court places
its sympathies. On the one hand the Roe and Cohen courts easily dismissed any
notion that insured is in a contractual situation with the insurance companies
where the companies call all of the shots and the insured is at their mercy. This
is how the Mendes, as well as the Schmidt, Nationwide and Pepin, courts would
characterize the relationship between the insurance companies and the insured.
Do the Roe and Cohen courts place too much emphasis on the fact that the
escape clauses are the product of contractual relationships in which the parties are
free to bargain as'to the terms? This author thinks so. Clearly these two courts
have ignored the reality that individuals who purchase automobile insurance have
absolutely no ability to bargain as to the terms of the coverage. If the insureds in
these cases had been large corporations that maintain large fleets of motor
vehicles, such as UPS or Federal Express, the bargaining powers of the insured
and the insurer would have arguably been on a more even basis. However, the
average purchaser of automobile insurance is in the position to merely select the
type of coverage he or she wants at the lowest cost. Such persons don't negotiate
over the amount of premiums to be paid, the claims settlement process, or
anything else. They merely "take it or leave it."
The Mendes court recognized this reality, as did the Schmidt, Nationwide, and
Pepin courts. The insurance contract is arguably an adhesion contract."' Thus,
these courts have put themselves in the position to protect the insured where it is
clear that he or she is at a great disadvantage in the contractual relationship.
Of course, these two courts did not rely solely on this line of analysis.
However, this analysis sheds light on why these courts were willing to say that the
escape clauses violated the public policy favoring arbitration, when the Roe and
Cohen courts maintained that the same escape clauses did not violate the same
public policy that favors arbitration.
L. DEAN WILSON

141. A. WIDISS, supra note 24, § 23.2, at 151. See also Schmidt, 413 N.W.2d at 181.
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